Manu Caddie is an inaugural member of the Cali Fund Steering Committee, representing the Pacific region, here he writes in his role as an occasional policy advisor for Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust.
The following version of this post has been updated from the original (31/8/26) based on additional information contained in a longer piece published on 7 August by TWN helpfully brought to my attention by the author Nithin Ramakrishnan – who I have great respect for in relation to his tireless advocacy for Indigenous Peoples and local communities around the world and have appreciated his contributions as a thoughtful and deeply engaged ‘observer’ to the Steering Committee. While I’ve challenged many of the claims in his recent pieces on these issues, I’m really grateful for Nithin’s efforts to critique the process and raise the questions in a structured way that others can engage with. A handful of others have also been trying to shed light on the options and procedures, offer analysis of how this thing is best going to work – it is all appreciated and I’ve found it hugely helpful.
Third World Network’s 6 August article published by the CBD Alliance, “Cali Fund MoU: Turning a benefit-sharing fund into a donor-controlled fund?” and the longer related piece published on the TWN website the following day, raise a number of legitimate questions about transparency and recipient protections.
The concerns are substantial and many of them are widely shared. As TWN notes, at SBI 7 last month, the African Group and the Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries called for the MoU and related institutional documents to be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties. Other developing countries supported closer scrutiny and better alignment with the rights of provider countries and Indigenous Peoples and local communities. I fully acknowledge that the demand for COP review is therefore a well-established governmental position, not just TWN’s.
That demand should nevertheless be distinguished from the TWN article’s broader conclusion. The evidence supports reviewing and, where necessary, adapting the administrative agreements. However I’m not convinced it establishes that contributors have acquired control of the Cali Fund or that the Fund has already been transformed into a conventional donor-controlled institution. The procedural concern is legitimate, but Decision 16/2 does not expressly require a Steering Committee first reading or prior COP approval of every administrative instrument. Whether particular documents introduce substantive governance arrangements requiring COP approval is the question that we need to look into carefully.
The Fund’s formal governance arrangements do not eliminate the possibility of financial pressure. Contributors can exercise influence through the availability of funding. But financial influence, contractual protection and institutional control are different claims. A claim like this should identify which power has been transferred, to whom, and through which provision.
The published company contribution letter reinforces the respective roles of participants in the transaction. It accepts management of the contribution under the Fund’s terms of reference and UNDP’s rules, but does not grant DSI users the donor remedies found in the Standard Administrative Arrangement used in some other UN funds. It gives companies no authority to choose recipients, direct projects or initiate proceedings against recipient organisations, and it restricts commercial use of UN names and emblems. These provisions do not resolve every ambiguity in the institutional documents, but they aren’t consistent with claims that a DSI payment automatically purchases the full package of donor rights provided for in other UN processes.
Using “benefit-sharing contributions” consistently would improve the documents. Nevertheless, terminology alone cannot establish that benefit sharing has become charity or that contractual rights arise simply from the label attached to a payment.
I think the TWN article also overstates what a Cali Fund contribution offers. Decision 16/2 provides recognition for qualifying contributions within the scope of the multilateral mechanism for the relevant year. It explicitly does not create a universal release from other benefit-sharing obligations. The decision preserves national access and benefit-sharing measures and existing international obligations. So, a more accurate explanation, at least as I understand it, is that a qualifying contribution provides recognition within the defined scope of the multilateral mechanism for the relevant year; it does not automatically settle every benefit-sharing claim concerning DSI.
What about the rights to stop payments? The MoU’s section II, paragraph 8 expressly concerns ‘donors’ signing Administrative Arrangements. It permits discontinuation of future deposits in specified circumstances, including failures to fulfil obligations, substantial revisions to the terms of reference, or credible allegations of improper use. It requires consultation beforehand. This can create financial leverage, but it is not a general power to dictate allocations or cancel any recipient’s funding at will.
The provision allowing a contributor to recover its proportional share of misused funds is contributor-protective and I agree with TWN that it should be reviewed for compatibility with the Fund’s benefit-sharing principles. This provision concerns the remedy for funds that were not used as authorised, but it still does not confer control over valid allocations or permit a contributor to redirect properly used funds. Regardless, the repayment provision needs fixing.
There are, however, provisions that deserve robust critique. The published standard Non-UN Organisation Framework Agreement contains donor recourse for contractual non-compliance, broad access rights for project reviews, and arbitration provisions applying the law of the pursuing donor’s country of domicile and requiring the arbitration to be seated in that country’s capital. Certain provisions require donor consent to amendment. TWN is right to flag these features. The publicly available document is a generic template however, and does not establish that these are the definitive terms that will be applied unchanged to Cali Fund recipient organisations.
The warning about sacred lands needs similar precision. Article 8.7 connects access to reviews or evaluations of approved projects and to the recipient organisation’s premises, personnel and materials. It does not expressly confer a general right to enter Indigenous territories. Its breadth could nevertheless create problems where project premises include sacred places. Explicit protections for consent, cultural confidentiality and territorial rights would be preferable to relying on interpretation and the breadth of the clause itself does justify amendment, irrespective of whether entry to sacred lands has occurred.
Recognising that risk does not establish TWN’s wider proposition that contributors have taken control of the Fund. The key question is whether accountability should operate through the Steering Committee and other Fund institutions rather than through direct enforcement by individual contributors. In my discussions with industry representatives, their stated priority has been assurance that contributions produce positive outcomes for communities and biodiversity, rather than assuming any role in policing individual recipients. Those discussions are of course anecdotal, but they reinforce the case for institutional accountability rather than direct contributor control.
An assessment of Indigenous rights must also consider the Fund’s terms of reference and the wider institutional framework. The Fund’s published terms of reference expressly recognise Indigenous Peoples’ and local communities’ rights, adopt a human-rights-based approach, and refer to CBD guidance concerning sacred sites, cultural heritage and consent. These commitments do not automatically cure conflicting contractual clauses, but they cannot fairly be omitted from an assessment of the institutional framework.
Benefit sharing also remains compatible with financial accountability. Decision 16/2 requires funds to be allocated accountably and provides that designated national recipient entities should meet internationally accepted fiduciary standards and report on activities and impacts. Reasonable financial accountability is therefore part of the negotiated design. The real debate will need to be about who oversees recipients, through which procedures and with what safeguards, not whether the Fund should have accountability arrangements at all.
The certificate criticism identifies a question worth answering, rather than proof of contributor control. The terms of reference distinguish deposit receipts from certificates recognising contributions at the level specified by the COP. That distinction is not, by itself, a full verification system. The Fund should, as it works through the priority issues and options and makes decisions, explain how eligibility and contribution amounts are checked, and how incorrect certificates can be corrected or withdrawn.
Finally, Parties have every reason to examine the institutional documents. Decision 16/2 places the mechanism under COP authority and establishes transparency and inclusivity as governing principles. Its cited paragraphs do not, however, expressly prescribe a Steering Committee “first reading” before signature. The absence of that step can support a criticism of the process without automatically proving a breach of a specified approval requirement.
The concern about public access to the annexes – particularly Annex D, the Non-UN Organization Framework and Financing Agreements – will be addressed by publishing an authoritative and complete set of the documents intended to apply to the Cali Fund when they are ready. The absence of the definitive documents, however, cannot fairly be treated as evidence either that their terms are harmless or that the provisions in a separately published generic template already bind Cali Fund recipients. There is a real risk that standard MPTF agreements may not be suitable for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. The Steering Committee’s subsequent work to adapt the documents for the Cali Fund reinforces why the generic provisions shouldn’t be treated as final. Once that process is complete, the tailored agreements should be published before they are used.
SBI 7’s resulting recommendation reflects these issues, it asks COP 17 to consider an appropriate course of action concerning the MoU and related arrangements, in line with the Cali Fund’s benefit-sharing character and agreed governance. That is a mandate for proper scrutiny, but it is not a finding that contributor capture has already occurred.
The Cali Fund needs to deliver fair benefit sharing under the authority of the COP, with meaningful Indigenous Peoples and local communities participation. Defending that purpose requires accurate analysis and both critique and support where justified from all stakeholders. Analysis of the available documents identify a number of issues to resolve and TWN is right to highlight them, but the analysis so far doesn’t seem to justify the sweeping claim that the Fund has already been converted into a contributor-controlled entity.
Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust 